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TOWARD A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE
GROWING HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC IN RUSSIA: A CASE
FOR EXPANDED HEALTH PRIVACY
Carrie C. Gage†
Abstract: The Russian Federation faces one of the fastest growing rates of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) infection in the world. In 1995, Russia
adopted comprehensive legislation addressing HIV and the disease caused by this virus,
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”).
The legislation prohibited
discrimination based on HIV infection and provided access to medical care for people
living with HIV/AIDS. Having recognized that Injecting Drug Users involved in sex
work will likely act as a bridge to the general population, the Russian government has
recently taken greater steps to curb transmission. Russia has moved to decriminalize the
distribution of hypodermic needles for prevention of infectious diseases and has
committed to increasing HIV/AIDS funding. Given the Russian government’s recent
dedication of additional funding to combat HIV/AIDS, this Comment seeks to identify
potential barriers to HIV/AIDS prevention in existing Russian law. In both testing and
treatment, inadequate protection of private health information may discourage individuals
from learning their HIV status and seeking treatment. As such, an effective legislative
solution to Russia’s growing epidemic must include greater protections for health
privacy. Comprehensive health privacy legislation in the United States may provide a
framework for enhancing existing health privacy protections for individuals living with
HIV/AIDS in Russia. Despite differences between the legal systems of Russia and the
United States, Russian law, like American law addressing health privacy, should clarify
the statutory right to health privacy, the remedies tied to the violation of that right, and
the path to legal redress for the right’s infringement.

I.

INTRODUCTION

“If the [Russian] leadership continues to pay only lip service to the
issue [of HIV/AIDS] . . . then the consequences . . . will be devastating
to . . . society, to family formation, to the military, to productivity of labor,
[and] to continued growth of the gross domestic product.”1 Russia faces one
of the fastest growing rates of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”)
infection in the world.2 The HIV epidemic there has been characterized by
“explosive outbreaks among vulnerable populations . . . .”3 Between 1997
†
Juris Doctor expected 2008, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Professor Veronica Taylor for her guidance, and
Judson Heugel for support and insight into this topic.
1
Peter Finn, HIV/AIDS in Russia May Be Triple Official Rate, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2005, at A2
(quoting MURRAY FESHBACH & CRISTINA M. GALVIN, HIV/AIDS IN RUSSIA – AN ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS
(Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars, 2005)).
2
WHO, SUMMARY COUNTRY PROFILE FOR HIV/AIDS TREATMENT SCALE-UP: RUSSIAN
FEDERATION (2005), http://www.who.int/hiv/HIVCP_RUS.pdf.
3
Catherine M. Lowndes et al., Conditions for Widespread Heterosexual Spread of HIV in the
Russian Federation: Implications for Research, Monitoring and Prevention, 14 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 45, 49
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and 2005, the number of officially registered HIV positive individuals in
Russia ballooned from 3623 to 327,899.4 While estimates vary, it is likely
that one million Russians (over one percent of the population) are infected.5
At the current rate of infection, more than fourteen million Russians could
be infected with HIV by the year 2020.6
In 1995, the Russian Federation adopted comprehensive legislation
prohibiting discrimination based on HIV infection or Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”).7 Because of the potential for Injecting
Drug Users (“IDUs”) to act as a bridge to the general population,8 the
Russian government has begun to take greater legislative steps to stem the
epidemic, and, in 2006, committed greatly increased funds to HIV/AIDS
prevention and treatment.9
Yet more than ten years after the passage of comprehensive
HIV/AIDS legislation, Russians living with HIV/AIDS continue to face
discrimination based on their health status.10 Knowledge that HIV test
results will remain confidential may encourage individuals to get tested.11
Conversely, a lack of adequate protection for private health information may
discourage individuals from learning their health status and seeking
treatment. While Russian law provides protections for health privacy—
which may include information related to HIV infection—the parameters of
such protections are largely undefined in the law.12

(2003). An epidemic is classified as “an outbreak of disease among members of a specific population that
exceeds the extent of occurrence of the disease normally found in that population.” Marc Kusinitz,
Epidemic, 2 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE 1498, 1498 (K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Lerner eds., 2004). A
single case of an unexpected disease can indicate an epidemic. S. Ryan Johansson, Epidemics, 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULATION 302, 302 (Paul Demeny & Geoffrey McNicoll eds., 2003). Generally,
“[e]pidemic diseases break out, reach a peak, and subside . . . .” Id.
4
WHO, supra note 2, at 1.
5
To Slow AIDS in Russia, Treat HIV-Positive Addicts, Stanford Study Says, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 9,
2006 [hereinafter To Slow AIDS in Russia].
6
Erika Niedowski, Russia Resists Needle Swap: Officially, Exchanges ‘Taboo’ in Nation With High
HIV Rate, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Jul. 9, 2006.
7
See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 1995, No. 14, Item 1212 (“Federal Law No. 38-FZ of March 30, 1995 on the Prevention of the
Incidence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Disease in the Russian Federation”) [hereinafter
Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation].
8
See Tim Rhodes et al., HIV Transmission and HIV Prevention Associated with Injecting Drug Use
in the Russian Federation, 15 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 1, 2 (2004) (noting emerging evidence of the
stabilization of infection among IDUs rates, together with increased sexual transmission).
9
WHO, supra note 2, at 1.
10
See infra Part II.B.
11
See Sheri D. Weiser et al., Routine HIV Testing in Botswana: A Population-Based Study on
Attitudes, Practices, and Human Rights Concerns, 3 PLOS MED. 1013, 1018 (2006).
12
See infra Part IV.
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Given the Russian government’s recent dedication to combating the
spread of HIV/AIDS, this Comment seeks to identify potential barriers to
HIV prevention in Russian law. Part II of this Comment examines how
social stigma related to drug use and to HIV infection in Russia has hindered
voluntary HIV testing and concludes that additional protections for health
status may encourage individuals to seek care.13 Part III contends that
because the perceived privacy of health-related information may encourage
HIV testing which, in turn, may reduce transmission, Russian law related to
HIV/AIDS should contain strong protections for health privacy. Part IV
argues that Russian law expressly protects the right to health privacy, but
contends that conflict in existing law leaves the parameters of health privacy
uncertain. Part V establishes that a lack of clear remedies for violations of
health privacy exacerbates the unclear parameters of health privacy
protection. Part VI compares Russian laws protecting health privacy to
comprehensive health privacy legislation in the United States, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).14 It concludes that,
despite jurisdictional and institutional differences between the United States
and Russia, Russian law should, like HIPAA, clarify the statutory right to
health privacy, the remedies tied to the violation of that right, and the path to
legal redress for the right’s infringement.
II.

SOCIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE
SPREAD, AND HAVE HINDERED TREATMENT, OF HIV/AIDS IN RUSSIA

Various social factors, including injection drug use, have contributed
to the spread of HIV/AIDS in Russia.15 Against this social background, the
Russian government has historically allocated little money to HIV/AIDS
care,16 and legislative enactments have impeded treatment of IDUs.17 Yet a
recent increase in funding for HIV/AIDS indicates heightened governmental
attention to the growing epidemic.18

13

This Comment assumes that individuals who seek care will have access to treatment. While HIV
care is already guaranteed under Russian law, currently the need for antiretroviral (“ARV”) therapy greatly
exceeds availability and, as of 2004, less than 3% of those in need of ARV therapy were receiving it. See
WHO, supra note 2, at 1.
14
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d-2)-(d-7) (2000).
15
See infra Part II.A-B.
16
See infra Part II.C.
17
See infra Part II.D.
18
See infra Part II.E.
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Social Factors Have Aided HIV/AIDS Transmission and Impacted
Disease Progression

Various social factors have impacted HIV transmission and disease
progress in Russia.19 Sex work has played an increasingly important role in
transmission, especially due to widespread lack of condom use.20 The
spread of HIV/AIDS has also been linked to conditions of the Russian penal
system which, by 1998, held about one million people.21 Because prisons
may house many thousands of infected and non-infected individuals
together,22 “[they] are likely to serve as ‘incubators’ in which the virus will
spread rapidly.”23 By 2001, HIV was twenty-six times as prevalent within
the prison population as within the general public.24 Finally, the cooccurrence of other infectious diseases has complicated Russia’s growing
HIV epidemic.25 For example, poverty and unemployment have contributed
to rapid growth in Tuberculosis (“TB”) in Russia.26 In turn, TB is a leading
cause of mortality for people living with HIV/AIDS.27
But most importantly, HIV transmission in Russia is linked to
injection drug use. The current epidemic is concentrated among IDUs,28
with approximately ninety percent of infections associated with injection
drug use.29 After the fall of the Soviet Union, accessible borders led to a
“boom of illegal markets,” particularly in narcotics.30 Russia now has
between 1.5 and 3.5 million IDUs.31 Consequently, any program to reduce
HIV transmission in Russia should target this population.32
19

See David E. Powell, The Problem of AIDS, in RUSSIA’S TORN SAFETY NETS: HEALTH AND
SOCIAL WELFARE DURING THE TRANSITION 123, 128-32 (Mark G. Field & Judyth L. Twigg eds., 2000).
20
See id. at 128.
21
Id. at 130.
22
William E. Butler, Injecting Drug Use and HIV: Harm-Reduction Programs and the Russian
Legal System, in RULING RUSSIA: LAW, CRIME, AND JUSTICE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 205, 206 (William
Alex Pridemore ed., 2005).
23
Powell, supra note 19, at 130.
24
ANATOLY VINOKUR ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 510, THE
TB AND HIV/AIDS EPIDEMICS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 33 (2001).
25
See A. Van Rie et al., TB and HIV in St. Petersburg, Russia: A Looming Catastrophe? 9 INT’L J.
OF TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG DISEASE 740, 740 (2005).
26
Id. at 740.
27
Id. at 742.
28
WHO, supra note 2, at 1.
29
Rhodes et al., supra note 8, at 2.
30
Letizia Paoli, The Price of Freedom: Illegal Drug Markets and Policies in Post-Soviet Russia, 582
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 167, 168 (2002); see also Butler, supra note 22, at 207 (noting that
between 1993 and 2001, the conviction rate for narcotics crimes may have increased by as much as 500
percent).
31
WHO, supra note 2, at 1.
32
See To Slow AIDS in Russia, supra note 5.
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The Stigma Surrounding HIV Infection Impedes Treatment

Discriminatory attitudes in Russia toward HIV infection act as a
barrier to treatment. In Russia, discrimination against people living with
HIV/AIDS is common.33 Among the general public, there is a lack of
knowledge of the basic facts of HIV/AIDS transmission,34 and a generalized
fear of contracting the disease.35 Likewise, ignorance about the spread of
HIV/AIDS is widespread among health professionals in Russia.36 The
Russian Chief Sanitary Doctor, Gennady Onishchenko, calls discrimination
“[t]he main obstacle in the fight against AIDS.”37
According to
Onishchenko, discrimination has resulted in economic losses for Russia,
because HIV positive youth are often “categorized as outcasts.”38 In a 2006
study of HIV infection in Russia, researchers concluded that addressing
stigma is essential to encouraging testing and combating the disease.39
C.

HIV/AIDS Policy Has Focused on Untargeted Testing Rather than
Treatment

Resources for treatment of individuals living with HIV/AIDS in
Russia vary widely,40 and health care professionals often lack access to new
drugs.41 While the World Health Organization (“WHO”) recommends that
countries allocate five percent of their Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) to
health care, Russia allocates less than three percent.42 Thus, in 2005, fewer
than one percent of those currently infected with HIV in Russia, about five
thousand patients, received antiretroviral (“ARV”) therapy,43 drug regimens
which disrupt the progression of HIV.44

33

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LESSONS NOT LEARNED: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND HIV/AIDS IN THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 13 (2004).
34
Id.; see also Y. Balabanova et al., Stigma and HIV Infection in Russia, 18 AIDS CARE 846, 850
(2006) (noting that in a recent study of attitudes towards HIV infection in Russia, a participant explained, “I
know how to protect myself. Use condoms, be careful on the buses, don’t touch handrails.”).
35
Powell, supra note 19, at 132.
36
See id. at 124.
37
Russia Suffering Great Economic Losses Due to Discrimination Against HIV-Infected, DAILY
NEWS BULL., Dec. 8, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Russia Suffering Great Economic Losses].
38
Id.
39
Balabanova et al., supra note 34, at 846.
40
Powell, supra note 19, at 136-37.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 132.
43
To Slow AIDS in Russia, supra note 5.
44
UNAIDS, Antiretroviral Therapy, http://www.unaids.org/en/Issues/Prevention_treatment/
antiretroviral_therapy.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
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While governmental contribution to health care has been relatively
small, the Russian government has traditionally focused on HIV screening.45
Twenty million people were screened for HIV infection each year between
1991 and 1999.46 Many of these individuals were subject to mandatory
screening.47 Not only can such untargeted screening of healthy individuals
“squander[]” public funds,48 but data derived from screening may be
ambiguous.49
For example, such generalized screening “may . . .
underestimate the true proportion of at-risk populations infected, as [it] may
cover non-injectors and populations at lower risk . . . .”50 In addition, data
derived from such screening related to HIV prevalence, or the total number
of cases of disease,51 are “poor at detecting changes in” the rate of infection,
and, thus, are also poor at signaling “changes in the course of the
epidemic . . . .”52 Therefore, while Russian “mass surveillance” represents a
“traditional [approach to] infectious disease control,”53 and while testing is
essential to provision of effective treatment,54 more targeted surveillance of
defined high-risk groups could better elucidate the dynamics of HIV
transmission in Russia.55
D.

The Status of Harm Reduction Programs in Russia Remains
Uncertain, Discouraging IDUs’ Access to Treatment

In addition to focusing on screening rather than treatment of
HIV/AIDS, the Russian government has promoted inconsistent policy
toward needle exchange programs. Between thirty and forty percent of
Russian IDUs may share needles within a four week period.56 International
studies have demonstrated a decreased risk of syringe-sharing among

45

Powell, supra note 19, at 136.
VINOKUR ET AL., supra note 24, at 38.
47
Powell, supra note 19, at 136.
48
David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, Uses and Abuses of Screening Tests, 359 LANCET 881,
881 (2002).
49
See Lowndes et al., supra note 3, at 55.
50
Id. (noting that in 2000, official HIV prevalence of registered IDUs in Russia was only 5%, a
number much lower than that derived from clinical studies).
51
John M. Last, Incidence and Prevalence, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC HEALTH 609, 609 (Lester
Breslow ed., 2002).
52
Lowndes et al., supra note 3, at 55-56.
53
Id. at 55.
54
See infra Part III.
55
See Lowndes et al., supra note 3, at 56-57.
56
Rhodes et al., supra note 8, at 11.
46
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participants in needle exchange programs.57 Such programs are considered a
method of “harm reduction” intended to limit the damage caused by drug
use.58 Yet, while a recent amendment to the Russian Criminal Code
legalizes needle exchanges where needles are distributed to deter infectious
disease,59 the Ministry of Health has yet to issue guidelines for distribution
of needles.60 As such, needle exchanges have not yet been incorporated into
law, a move which could require changes to as many as two dozen legal
enactments.61
In the absence of such regulations, officials have refused to promote,62
and law enforcement authorities have often impeded,63 needle exchange
programs. Harassment by police in such contexts contributes to risky
behavior of IDUs.64 For example, a 2006 study demonstrated that Russian
IDUs who had attempted to utilize needle exchange programs were often
discouraged because of arrests of participants.65 By 2004, there were
approximately seventy-five needle exchange programs operating in Russia.66
As of 2006, only sixty programs were in operation,67 perhaps a result of
inconsistent policy toward harm reduction.
E.

Recent Policy Changes Indicate Heightened Governmental
Acknowledgement of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic

While the Russian government has historically allocated limited
resources to HIV/AIDS treatment, the last five years have been a period of
increased advocacy.68 Recently, President Vladimir Putin referred to
HIV/AIDS in Russia as “an acute problem, [requiring] the attention of all

57
Id. at 8 (citing e.g., F.I. Bastos & S. Strathdee, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Syringe Exchange
Programs, 51 SOC. SCI. & MED., 1771 (2000); D. Des Jarlais et al., HIV Incidence Among Injection Drug
Users in New York City Syringe-Exchange Programs, 348 LANCET 987 (1996)).
58
Niedowski, supra note 6.
59
Id. at 1; see Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2003, No. 50, Item 4848, art. 230 (“Federal Law No. 162-FZ of 2003 on
Introducing Amendments and Additions into the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation”) [hereinafter
Criminal Code Amendments].
60
Niedowski, supra note 6.
61
Butler, supra note 22, at 219 (noting that, while harm-reduction centers often distribute bleach and
teach clients to sterilize needles, the distribution of bleach in Russia requires a license.)
62
Niedowski, supra note 6.
63
VINOKUR ET AL., supra note 24, at 39.
64
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 18.
65
Balabanova et al., supra note 34, at 849.
66
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 17.
67
Niedowski, supra note 6.
68
Terry Murray, Fending Off Another Africa: A Look at Emerging HIV Hotspots, 42 MED. POST 18
(2006).
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sectors of society.”69 In line with such rhetoric, the government appears
poised to promote new HIV/AIDS policy. A Federal Program on AIDS
currently being developed by the Ministries of Health and Social
Development “is expected to reflect significant adjustments of the national
response . . . .”70 The Russian government has also taken steps in regional
leadership in fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2006, Russia hosted an
Eastern European regional meeting on HIV/AIDS.71
Finally, the
government has committed to increasing HIV/AIDS funding.72 In 2006,
President Putin allocated over one hundred million dollars for HIV/AIDS
treatment and prevention, a twenty-fold increase over previous allotments.73
Through both national and international funds, Russian authorities expect to
treat approximately 30,000 people in the next year.74
Such steps indicate that the government recognizes “HIV . . . is poised
to begin spreading quickly through the general population.”75 According to
the director of the Russian Federal AIDS Centre in Moscow, because the
number of deaths from HIV/AIDS is still small, this might be “the last
opportunity to prevent further spread of HIV infection and to prevent the
generalization of the epidemic in Russia.”76
III.

BECAUSE HIV/AIDS AND DRUG USE ARE HIGHLY STIGMATIZED IN
RUSSIA, INCREASED HEALTH PRIVACY MAY ENCOURAGE TREATMENT

Despite the Russian government’s increased funding for HIV/AIDS
prevention, policy should take into account the specific factors necessary for
prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS in Russia. Provision of appropriate
health services is essential to the treatment of HIV/AIDS.77 In particular,
ARV therapy may reduce the likelihood that an infected individual will

69
UNAIDS, Russian Federation, http://www.unaids.org/en/Regions_Countries/Countries/russian_
federation.asp [hereinafter UNAIDS, Russian Federation].
70
Id.
71
Dore Hollander, Russia Owns Up to HIV, 38 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH 124, 124 (2006).
72
WHO, supra note 2, at 1.
73
Id.
74
Russia Suffering Great Economic Losses, supra note 37, at 1; see also UNAIDS, Russian
Federation, supra note 69 (noting that the total expected budget for 2007 is double that of 2006 with “[t]he
total state budget increas[ing by] more than US $400 million, adding to the substantial funds” of
international donors).
75
Hollander, supra note 71, at 124.
76
Murray, supra note 68 (internal citation omitted).
77
Peter Aggleton et al., HIV/AIDS and Injecting Drug Use: Information, Education, and
Communication, 16S INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y S21, S22 (2005).

JANUARY 2008

HEALTH PRIVACY IN RUSSIA

165

transmit HIV.78 Ultimately, providing effective treatment requires testing
individuals for HIV infection.79
Effective HIV testing is thus of
“paramount” importance in the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS.80
Yet encouraging testing may entail requiring strong protections for
health privacy. The perceived privacy of health-related information may
increase voluntary behaviors—such as seeking testing—which, in turn, may
reduce transmission. A recent study in Botswana found that individuals that
held “stigmatizing attitudes” towards HIV infection were less likely to seek
testing.81 The study also identified knowledge that the results would remain
confidential as one of the most common facilitating factors in an individual’s
decision to be tested.82
Similarly, confidentiality concerns unique to IDUs may act as a
barrier to accessing treatment. Early access to drug treatment may prevent
future cases of HIV infection associated with injection drug use.83 Yet
Russian IDUs who access state treatment facilities must officially register
with the facility, which can lead to restrictions on employment and increased
social stigma.84 Drug treatment centers may share the names of registered
IDUs with the police. 85 Thus, fears of a lack of confidentiality associated
with treatment can pose a significant barrier to accessing care in Russia.86
Assuming that testing will lead to treatment and that increasing
treatment may reduce HIV/AIDS transmission rates, Russian policy should
specifically encourage at-risk individuals to seek HIV testing. Because
health information is especially sensitive,87 and because individuals living
with HIV/AIDS in Russia face particular stigma based on health status—
78
See Julio S G Montaner et al., The Case for Expanding Access to Highly Active Antiretroviral
Therapy to Curb the Growth of the HIV Epidemic, 368 LANCET 531, 531 (2006) (noting that highly active
antiretroviral therapy (HAART), a type of ARV therapy, has been shown to reduce the viral load of HIV
positive study participants, and that increased viral load predicts increased HIV transmission).
79
Stuart Rennie & Frieda Behets, Desperately Seeking Targets: The Ethics of Routine HIV Testing
in Low-Income Countries, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 52, 52 (2006).
80
UNAIDS/WHO, UNAIDS/WHO Policy Statement on HIV Testing, http://www.who.int/hiv/
pub/vct/en/hivtestingpolicy04.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2006); see also Don C. Des Jarlais et al.,
Interventions to Reduce the Sexual Risk Behavior of Injecting Drug Users, 16S INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y, S59,
S61 (2005) (noting that studies of IDUs “show[] that [those] who learn that they are HIV-positive greatly
increase their use of condoms . . . .”).
81
Weiser et al., supra note 11, at 1013.
82
Id. at 1018.
83
Natalia Bobrova et al., Barriers to Accessing Drug Treatment in Russia: A Qualitative Study
Among Injecting Drug Users in Two Cities, 82 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE S57, S57 (2006).
84
Id. at S59.
85
Id. at S60.
86
See id. at S59-60.
87
LISA M. BOYLE & DAVID M. MACK, HIPAA: A GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE PRIVACY AND SECURITY
LAW, 1:2 (5th ed. 2006).
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and, in many cases, drug use—policy should promote the protection of
individual health information.
IV.

WHILE RUSSIAN LAW PROTECTS HEALTH INFORMATION, THE
PARAMETERS OF HEALTH PRIVACY ARE UNCLEAR

The Russian Constitution, the highest source of domestic law,88
guarantees the right to personal privacy.89 While it is unclear whether the
constitutional protection of privacy impliedly includes health privacy,
express protections in Russian and international law provide such a statutory
right.90 Despite these express statutory protections of health privacy, laws
specifically related to HIV/AIDS and narcotics provide only minimal health
privacy protections.91 Current statutory limitations on health privacy in
Russian HIV/AIDS and narcotics laws are overbroad and, because health
privacy protections in existing legislation conflict, the parameters of privacy
protection remain unclear.
A.

Russian and International Laws Provide Privacy Protections for
Health-Related Information

Because the Russian Constitution expressly protects personal
information,92 it may impliedly protect information pertaining to health. Yet,
regardless of whether health privacy is constitutionally protected, Russian
and international law provide an express statutory right to health privacy.93
1.

Russian Domestic Law Protects Health-Related Information

Articles 23 and 24 of the Russian Constitution provide basic
protections for personal privacy that could be construed to protect healthrelated information.94 Under Article 23(1), “[e]veryone shall have the right
to the inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets . . . .”95 And,
under Article 24(1) “[t]he collection, keeping, use[,] and dissemination of
information about the private life of a person shall not be allowed without

88

WILLIAM BURNHAM ET AL., LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 10 (3rd ed.

2004).
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] arts. 23-24.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] arts. 23(1), 24(1).
See infra IV.A.
See Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] arts. 23(1), 24(1).
Id. art. 23(1).
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his or her consent.”96 This idea of “private life” entails “the functioning of
the individual in the special areas of family, social, personal and intimate
relations” including the “certainty of entrusting one’s personal and family
secrets with . . . a doctor . . . .”97 Thus, information about personal health,
such as a diagnosis, could qualify as information pertaining to “private life”
under Article 23(1).
But while the scope of the constitutional right to privacy remains
uncertain, the statutory right to health privacy is clear. Several Russian
statutes reportedly based on the Constitution expressly protect health
information. For example, two laws enacted in 2006, a law related to
personal data98 (“Law on Personal Data”) and a law on “Information,
Informational Technologies, and Protection of Information,”99 expressly
protect personal information. Under the Law on Personal Data, the
collection, use, and dissemination of personal data related to health is
generally prohibited.100 Likewise, under a law regarding health protection,
(“Law on Health Protection”) doctors are obligated to keep “medical
secrets.”101
Such “medical secrets” include “[i]nformation about
. . . requesting medical aid, [a] person’s state of health, the diagnosis of his
illness, and other data received during his observation and treatment . . . .”102
Notably, under the Law on Health Protection, patients have an express
personal right to the privacy of such information.103

96
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution]; see also BURNHAM ET AL., supra
note 88, at 248 (noting that Article 56(3) lists those rights not subject to any limitation, including those
granted under Articles 23(1) and 24).
97
Igor Petrukhin, The Judicial Protection of the Constitutional Rights and Freedoms in Russia:
Myths and Realties, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY? 25, 41-42 (Mark
Gibney & Stanislaw Frankowski eds., 1999).
98
See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2006, No. 31 (Part I), Item 3457 (“Federal Law No. 152-FZ of July 27, 2006 on Personal
Data”) [hereinafter Law on Personal Data].
99
See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2006, No. 31 (Part I), Item 3448 (“Federal Law No. 149-FZ of July 27, 2006 on Information,
Informational Technologies and Protection of Information”).
100
Law on Personal Data, supra note 98, art. 10(1).
101
See Vedomosti S”ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii I Verkhovnogo Soveta
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ved. RF] [Bulletin of the Congress of the People’s Deputies of the Russian
Federation and Supreme Council of the Russian Federation] 1993, No. 30, p. 1318, art. 60 (“Fundamentals
of the Legislation of the Russian Federation on Health Protection No. 5487-1 of July 22, 1993”)
[hereinafter Law on Health Protection].
102
Id. art. 61.
103
See id. art. 30(6).
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International Law Protects Health-Related Information

In addition to express statutory protections for health privacy,
international law provides broad, but undefined, protections for healthrelated information. Article 15(4) of the 1993 Russian Constitution directly
incorporates treaties, customary international law, and “generally recognized
principles and norms of international law.”104 And, under Article 15(4) of
the Constitution, treaty law preempts inconsistent domestic law.105
Russia is a party to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Human Rights Convention” or
“Convention”),106 which impliedly provides for privacy of health
information. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) has
construed the Human Rights Convention’s guarantee of the “right to respect
for . . . private and family life”107 as including medical information.108 The
ECHR has noted that “the protection of personal data, particularly medical
data, is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her
right to respect for private and family life . . . . Respecting the confidentiality
of health data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all the Contracting
Parties to the Convention.”109 Because international legal instruments
signed by Russia are incorporated into Russian law, the protection of
personal data under Russian law includes a broad right to the protection of
medical data.
B.

Russian Laws Related to HIV/AIDS and Narcotics Provide Limited
Protections for Information Related to Health Status

In contrast to clear statutory protections for health privacy in domestic
and international law, Russian legislation specifically related to HIV/AIDS
and narcotics offer limited protection for health information.110

104
William F. Flanagan, HIV/AIDS and Human Rights in Russia: Compliance and the Rule of Law,
39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 39, 58 (2001) (arguing that this “broad reference” incorporates new developments
in international law, “including decisions of competent international bodies . . . .”).
105
Id.
106
See Council of Eur., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:
Member States of the Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=
005&CM=7&DF=3/21/2007&CL=ENG (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
107
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
en/Treaties/Word/005.doc.
108
See M. S. v. Sweden, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 313, 337 (1997).
109
Id.
110
See infra Part IV.B.
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HIV/AIDS Laws Provide Weak Protection for Health Privacy

The federal law on HIV/AIDS prevention, “On the Prevention of the
Incidence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Disease in the
Russian Federation” (“Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation”),111 provides for
only limited confidentiality of health-related information.
First, by allowing for extensive mandatory HIV testing, the Omnibus
HIV/AIDS Legislation limits the rights of individuals to make confidential
decisions about health. The legislation broadly defines the categories of
people subject to the law as “[d]onors of blood, biological liquids, organs
and tissues,”112 and “workers of particular trades, production units,
enterprises, institutions and organizations, whose list is approved by the
Government of the Russian Federation.”113 Regulations issued in 1995
require that individuals who perform medical examinations, and who
diagnose and treat people with HIV/AIDS, are subject to such tests.114 Still,
the otherwise vague language of the law may authorize extensive testing of
undefined groups,115 leaving fewer individuals with the right to make
confidential decisions about health.
Second, in contrast to the Law on Health Protection,116 the Omnibus
HIV/AIDS Legislation does not require that individuals administering such
tests keep results confidential. Instead, the law gives individuals the choice
to seek confidentiality and does not presume it.117 Under the law, where
either governmental or private institutions administer voluntary tests,
individuals may request that those results remain anonymous.118 Thus, in
contrast to the Law on Health Protection,119 the Omnibus HIV/AIDS
Legislation does not expressly require confidentiality of test results of
individuals who fail to make such requests.120
111

Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra note 7.
Id. art. 9(1).
Id. art. 9(3).
114
Flanagan, supra note 104, at 61.
115
VINOKUR ET AL., supra note 24, at 38 (noting that vague terms have caused concern about
potential human rights abuses resulting from “[l]ack of information about the law on the part of testing
personnel and the person to be tested . . .”).
116
See Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, art. 60.
117
Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra note 7, art. 8.
118
Id. art. 8.
119
See Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, art. 60.
120
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 11; see also Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra
note 7, art. 9 (neglecting to include protections for confidentiality). But see Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Nov. 9,
1995, art. 14 (“Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1017 of October 13, 1995 on
Approving the Rules for Carrying out an Obligatory Medical Examination to Reveal the Virus of the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome in Man (the HIV-Infection)”) (noting that “[m]edical workers and
112
113
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Narcotics Laws Fail to Effectively Protect Health Information

Like the Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, Russian narcotics
legislation lacks strong protections for health privacy. A 1998 law, “On
Narcotic Agents and Psychotropic Substances,”121 (“Narcotics Law”)
criminalizes possession and use of illicit drugs122 and authorizes compulsory
examination123 and registration of drug users.124 Under the law, treatment of
drug users is authorized “only at the institutions of the state and in the
municipal public health systems.”125 Such provisions arguably conflict with
protections for health information delineated in the Law on Health
Protection.126 Furthermore, it is unclear whether protections granted under
the Law on Health Protection would override the limits placed on health
privacy under the Narcotics Law. Thus, because there is no express right to
health privacy in the Narcotics Law, the provisions authorizing compulsory
treatment and registration threaten individuals’ health privacy.
Similarly, recent amendments to the Criminal Code neglect to provide
effective privacy protection. As noted above, amendments to the Criminal
Code allow for needle exchanges where needles are distributed in order to
curb infectious disease.127 Yet, the Ministry of Health has yet to issue
guidelines for distribution of needles.128 Without such regulations, federal
legislation does not clearly define the connection between drug use and
HIV/AIDS. A lack of regulations means a lack of effective protection of the
health status of individuals with HIV/AIDS seeking treatment for drug use.

other persons made aware of the results of the examination through their official or professional duties
shall be obliged to keep this information secret.”) (emphasis added).
121
See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 1998, No. 2, Item 219 (“Federal Law No. 3-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Narcotic Agents and
Psychotropic Substances”).
122
Id. art. 59.
123
Id. art. 44 (noting that a “person, with respect to whom there are sufficient grounds to believe that
he suffers from narcomania, is in the state of narcotic intoxication, or has consumed a narcotic agent
without a doctor’s prescription, may be sent for a medical examination.”).
124
Id. art. 56.
125
Id. art. 55(2).
126
See Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, art. 61.
127
Niedowski, supra note 6; see also Criminal Code Amendments, supra note 59, art. 230 (“The
operation of this Article shall not extend to instances of popularization, for the purpose of preventing HIV
infection and other dangerous infectious diseases, of appropriate tools and equipment usable for
consumption of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, where these deeds have been committed by
approbation of the executive bodies in charge of health care . . . .”).
128
Niedowski, supra note 6.
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Current Permissible Disclosures of Health Information Are
Overbroad and Statutory Protections Are in Conflict

Limits on the protection of health information in current legislation
are overbroad. First, while the right to health privacy is clearly protected by
statute,129 if this right is derived from the constitutional right to privacy, the
right is not subject to restriction. The Russian Constitution permits the
restriction of individual rights as required for the “protection of the
fundamental principles of the constitutional system, morality, [and]
health . . . .”130 Yet specific constitutional rights, including the right to
privacy, may be not limited.131 Thus, if health privacy is implicit in the
constitutional right to privacy, limits on that right in existing law may be
invalid.
Second, the means chosen for the restriction of even a statutory right
must be proportionate to the threat posed by the exercise of that right.132 As
the Russian Constitutional Court has noted with regard to such
proportionality, “norm[s] should be formally defined, exact, sharp, and clear,
not allowing an expanded interpretation of the limitations
established . . . .”133
Current restrictions on health privacy under Russian statutes are
disproportionate responses to the threats posed by the exercise of the right.
For example, the authorization of mandatory HIV testing under the Omnibus
HIV/AIDS Legislation134 is a disproportionate response to the threat of
transmission of disease. The annual testing of millions of people135 may not
effectively target those at risk of infection or elucidate the dynamics of the
epidemic.136 In particular, more targeted screening of well-defined groups
could lead to a greater understanding of the Russian HIV epidemic and
allow the design of more effective interventions.137 Similarly, limits on
health privacy under the Law on Health Protection are disproportionate to
the threat posed by confidentiality. Under the law, “medical secrets” may be
129

See supra Part IV.A.1.
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 55(3).
131
Id. art. 56(3).
132
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 249.
133
Id., supra note 88, at 250 (quoting Sabranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatssi [SZ RF]
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2003, No. 44, Item 4358 (“On Provisions of the Federal
Statute ‘On the Basic Guaranties of Election Rights and of the Right to Participate in a Referendum of
Citizens of the Russian Federation.”).
134
Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra note 7, art. 9.
135
VINOKUR ET AL., supra note 24, at 38.
136
See Lowndes et al., supra note 3, at 56.
137
Id. at 56-57; see also supra Part II.C.
130
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released in the case of “a threat of the spread of infectious diseases, mass
poisoning, or contagion”138 or “when there are grounds for the belief that an
injury to the health of a person has been inflicted as the result of illegal
actions.”139 Because HIV infection could be a “threat of the spread” of an
infectious disease, and because suspected injection drug use could be a basis
for believing that injury resulted from illegal behavior, the law might widely
allow the release of any information related to HIV infection despite the fact
that not all incidences of HIV infection are likely to result in the further
spread of infectious disease.
Finally, even if current limits on health privacy are not overbroad,
conflicts in existing law leave the parameters of health privacy protection
unclear. For example, under the Law on Health Protection, unless an
exception applies, it is “impermissible to disclose information that makes up
a medical secret,” including diagnosis.140
But under the Omnibus
HIV/AIDS Legislation, where voluntary tests are administered, individuals
must request that results remain anonymous.141 This suggests that the Law
on Health Protection’s presumption of confidentiality conflicts with the
apparent opposite presumption under the Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation
—that it is the patient’s responsibility to ensure confidentiality. Such
conflicts ultimately obscure the parameters of the statutory right.
V.

REMEDIES IN CURRENT RUSSIAN LAW DO NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
PROTECTION OF HEALTH PRIVACY

While remedies may promote compliance with law, a lack of precise
remedial measures leaves individuals’ rights uncertain.142 Vague remedial
measures and an uncertain path to legal redress for violations of health
privacy create greater ambiguity with regard to the scope of the statutory
right.143
A.

Clear Remedies Deter Future Violations of Law

Rights may be less valuable if not accompanied by effective
remedies.144 This is because remedies ideally “redress [a] wrong by creating
138

Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, art. 61(2).
Id. art. 61(5).
140
Id. art. 61.
141
Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra note 7, art. 8.
142
Infra Part V.A.
143
See infra Part V.B-C.
144
See Louis E. Wolcher, The Paradox of Remedies: The Case of International Human Rights Law,
38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 515, 525 (2000).
139
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the situation that would have existed had the wrong not occurred.”145
Effective remedies may also result in deterrence, whereby punishment
influences the behavior of potential actors.146 Remedies are assumed to have
deterrent quality “because rational actors weigh the anticipated costs of
transgressions against the anticipated benefits.”147 Finally, remedies are
believed to promote future compliance.148
Remedies may be in the form of restitution, or, where restitution is not
feasible, compensation.149 Where compensation is utilized, “every legal
system should strive for certainty in calculating damages to avoid under- or
over-compensating a victim” because “arbitrariness in awards undermines
respect for the law . . . .” 150 In this way, certainty in remedies can reinforce
rule of law: clarity “implies that society administers justice by fixing
standards that individuals may determine prior to controversy and that
reasonably guarantee all individuals like treatment.”151
B.

Vague Remedies for Breaches of Health Privacy Under Russian Law
Fail to Promote Compliance

Current laws related to HIV/AIDS and privacy provide vague
remedies for violations.152 Such unclear remedies likely do not effectively
deter breaches of confidentiality.153 And, though international law provides
a private right of action for the violation of health privacy, available
international legal remedies are not likely to deter future violations. 154
1.

Russian Law Provides Vague Remedies for Breaches of Health
Privacy

Various sources of Russian law provide remedies for breaches of
privacy generally, yet such remedies do not clearly apply to breaches of
health privacy. First, sources of law that expressly relate to health neglect to
specify which types of violations merit specific liability. For example, the
Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation and the Law on Health Protection provide
145

JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 2 (2d ed. 2006).
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 13 (2d ed. 2005).
Id.
148
Wolcher, supra note 144, at 524.
149
SHELTON, supra note 146, at 9.
150
Id. at 20. But see id. at 21 (noting that, in the case of human rights violations, “compensation as a
remedy should not diminish consideration of the need for other kinds of redress.”).
151
Id.
152
Infra Part V.B.1.
153
Infra Part V.B.2.
154
See SHELTON, supra note 146, at 9.
146
147
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for disciplinary, administrative, and criminal liability,155 but do not define
what constitutes a breach of the law, or which type of breach would result in
a penalty.
Second, while the Russian Criminal Code,156 Administrative Code,157
and Civil Code158 provide for clear remedial action for the violation of the
right to privacy generally, these enactments do not explicitly pertain to
health information. For example, under the Criminal Code, “[i]llegal
. . . spreading of information about the private life of a person . . . without
his consent,” may be punished by a fine of up to two hundred thousand
rubles, by the income of a person for up to eighteen months, or by
compulsory labor for up to 180 hours.159 While sanctions under the law are
clear, they may not apply to violations of health privacy. Similarly, the Civil
Code provides a remedial right associated with violations of personal nonproperty rights—including the right to personal privacy.160 In particular,
Article 151 of the Civil Code grants courts the authority to impose monetary
compensation for violations of personal privacy rights.161 While the Civil
Code leaves the scope of potential violations and of possible monetary fines
undefined, it authorizes courts to consider “the extent of the culprit’s guilt”
as well as “the depth of the physical and moral sufferings” of the victim.162
If privacy includes health privacy, violations of confidentiality could warrant
a penalty under Article 151. However, this interpretation is unclear from the
plain language of the Code.163
Because laws referencing health privacy do not clarify how remedies
should be applied, and because clear remedies for violation of privacy do not
expressly relate to health privacy, the scope of remedies for violations of
health privacy remain unclear. As such, current laws likely do not
effectively deter breaches of health privacy.164

155

Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra note 7, art. 24; Law on Health Protection, supra note 101,

art. 61.
156

Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 137(1).
Kodeks RF ob Administrativnykh Pravonarusheniiakh [KOAP] [Code of Administrative
Violations] arts. 13(11)-(13).
158
Grazhdanskii Kodeks [GK] [Civil Code] art. 150.
159
Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 137(1).
160
See Grazhdanskii Kodeks [GK] [Civil Code] art. 150.
161
See id art. 151; see also BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 371 (noting that Article 1064 allows
courts to impose both economic and non-economic damages, and generally provides for the full
compensation of harm by the person who has willfully or negligently caused such harm).
162
Grazhdanskii Kodeks [GK] [Civil Code] art. 151.
163
Furthermore, the author knows of no judicial opinions interpreting the scope of this article.
164
See SHELTON, supra note 146, at 20 (noting that, in general, “arbitrariness in [remedies]
undermines respect for the law . . .”).
157
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Though International Law Grants a Private Right of Action for
Violations of Health Privacy, It Likely Does Not Promote Deterrence

The Russian Constitution guarantees the right to appeal to
international bodies for the protection of human rights upon exhaustion of
local remedies.165 Yet such a right does not promote future compliance with
Russian domestic laws related to health privacy.
The Human Rights Convention provides only limited individual
remedies. Under Protocol 9 to the Human Rights Convention, to which
Russia is a party,166 individuals have a private right of action for Convention
violations.167 However, under the Convention, the ECHR does not have the
remedial power to order a state to change its laws.168 While Russia’s laws
related to health privacy have not been tested before the ECHR,169 the court
would lack the power to bring the law into compliance with international
legal obligations. Thus, while an individual may obtain legal redress
through the ECHR, a judgment proclaiming a breach of confidentiality
would likely not deter future breaches involving different individuals.170
C.

Inadequacies in the Russian Judicial and Regulatory Systems Leave
Individuals Without Access to Remedial Measures

In addition to a lack of predictable remedies for breaches of rights
related to health privacy, individuals with HIV/AIDS in Russia lack a
consistent means of achieving redress.171 Access to justice implies that
existing procedures are “capable of redressing the harm . . . inflicted.”172
165

Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 46(3).
See Council of Eur., Protocol No. 9 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental
Freedoms,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=140&CM=
7&DF=5/4/2007&CL=ENG (last visited May 4, 2007); see also Protocol No. 9 to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 6,
1990, Europ. T.S. No. 140, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/140.doc
[hereinafter Protocol No. 9], superseded by Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/155.doc [hereinafter Protocol No. 11].
167
Wolcher, supra note 144, at 551; Protocol No. 9, supra note 166, art. 5; Protocol No. 11 supra
note 166, art. 34.
168
Wolcher, supra note 144, at 552.
169
See BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 245 (noting that in the ten decisions involving Russia
before the court by 2004, all went against Russia and most dealt with “procedural failures.”).
170
But see id. at 234-35 (noting that, while few cases from Russia have been brought before the
European Court of Human Rights, the 2001 Criminal Procedure Code allows for the reopening of a
previously decided case based on the ruling of the European Court) (citing Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2001, No. 52 (part I), Item
1921, art 413 (4)(2)).
171
See infra Part V.C.1.
172
SHELTON, supra note 146, at 9.
166
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But in Russia the overlapping jurisdiction of courts and executive bodies
leave the path to redress uncertain.173
1.

The Jurisdictional Reach of Russian Courts Obscures the Path to
Redress

While the Russian Constitution explicitly grants citizens the right to
seek remedies before a court,174 it is unclear which courts have jurisdiction
to hear claims based on violations of health privacy.
The structure and function of the Russian judiciary creates this
uncertainty. The courts of the Russian judiciary are divided into three
parallel branches.175 While the three branches comprise a single system,176
the courts’ overlapping jurisdiction threatens their authority.177 Currently,
two branches of the judiciary may interpret the same law differently.178
Alternatively, courts charged with a particular duty by law may altogether
neglect to fulfill that function.179 For example, while the Constitutional
Court is the only Court with the legal authority to analyze the
constitutionality of enactments,180 under the current system, “it is not clear
that the referral of all constitutional issues is mandatory.”181 Finally, the
effect of precedent in the Russian legal system is unclear.182 While the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation can issue “explanations” of the
law as direction for lower courts, jurists have long debated the legal effects
of such decisions, in particular, whether they constitute normative legal
sources.183
173

See infra Part V.C.1-2.
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 46(1).
175
Peter Krug, Internalizing European Court of Human Rights Interpretations: Russia’s Courts of
General Jurisdiction and New Directions in Civil Defamation Law, 32 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2006)
(noting that the three courts include the Constitutional Court, courts of general jurisdiction, and “arbitrazh”
(commercial courts)).
176
W.E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 154 (Oxford University Press, 1999).
177
Pamela Jordan, Russian Courts: Enforcing the Rule of Law? in BUILDING THE RUSSIAN STATE:
INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AND THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 193, 195 (Valerie Sperling ed.,
2000).
178
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 51.
179
See id. at 98.
180
Marat Salikov, Russia’s Transition to Democracy: Constitutional Justice and the Protection of
Civil Liberties, 24, in THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM IN RUSSIA (William Vanden Heuvel ed., 2000). The
Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over legislation such as federal laws, acts of the President, acts of the
State Duma, and acts of the Russian Federation. BUTLER, supra note 176, at 157. The Court may also
consider alleged violations of constitutional rights of citizens, and may interpret the Constitution. Id.
181
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 98.
182
See Peter Krug, Departure from the Centralized Model: The Russian Supreme Court and
Constitutional Control of Legislation, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 725, 735 (1997).
183
See id.
174
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The overlapping jurisdiction of courts also threatens the path to
consistent legal redress for violations of health privacy. For example, an
individual might be able to sue in either the Supreme Court or the
Constitutional Court for violations of health privacy. The Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation is the highest court of general jurisdiction,184 with
appellate jurisdiction over all legal disputes not assigned to the other judicial
branches.185 The Supreme Court hears civil, criminal, and administrative
cases,186 and has issued decisions regarding rights to privacy protected under
the Russian Constitution187 and the Civil Code.188 Alternately, because the
Constitutional Court may consider alleged violations of constitutional rights
of citizens or the constitutionality of federal laws,189 a suit challenging the
constitutionality of limits to health privacy in existing statute could be
brought before the Constitutional Court. Such unresolved jurisdiction
renders courts unable to consistently redress violations of health privacy.
2.

The Lack of a Central Authority Governing Health-Related
Information Leaves Remedies Uncertain

Finally, individuals lack a clear administrative remedy for violations
of health privacy under existing law. While current laws appear to
contemplate a shared role for courts and executive bodies to hear complaints
related to privacy, these laws neglect to specify designated executive bodies
for such hearings.190 For example, the Law on Health Protection states that
individuals injured by state institutions may appeal to state bodies but
neglects to name any particular state body. 191 Similarly, the Administrative
Code delegates the trial of administrative offenses related to breaches of
privacy to unspecified “[b]odies exercising state supervision over

184

BUTLER, supra note 176, at 161.
See Krug, supra note 182, at 726-30.
186
BUTLER, supra note 176, at 161. The Supreme Court can initiate review of lower court decisions.
See Krug, supra note 182, at 733-34.
187
See, e.g., Rossiiskaia Gazeta [Ros. gaz.] Dec. 28, 1995, pt. 14 (“Decision of the Plenum of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 8 of October 31, 1995 on Particular Issues of Application of
the Constitution of the Russian Federation by Courts When Administering Justice”).
188
See, e.g., Biulleten’ Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoy Federatsii [BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation], 2005, No. 4, pt. 8 (“Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation No. 3 of February 24, 2005 on Judicial Practice in Cases on the Protection
of Citizens’ Honour [sic] and Dignity, as Well as of Citizens’ and Legal Entities’ Business Reputation”).
189
BUTLER, supra note 176, at 157.
190
See Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, art. 69; Law on Personal Data, supra note 98, art.
23.
191
Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, art. 69.
185
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communication.”192 Likewise, the Law on Personal Data authorizes an
unnamed executive body to hear complaints based on misuse of general
personal information.193
Finally, while the State Sanitary and
Epidemiological Service of the Ministry of Health and Social Development
is authorized to try public health offenses,194 the Ministry’s authority does
not expressly include offenses related to health privacy. In effect, no law
clearly defines the path to legal redress before an executive body for
violations of health privacy.
VI.

A LAW AUTHORIZING AGENCY OVERSIGHT AND CLARIFYING REMEDIAL
MEASURES PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE IN RUSSIA

The United States’ comprehensive health privacy law provides insight
for legislative change in Russia. In 1996, the United States enacted
comprehensive health privacy legislation, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).195 The legislation and accompanying
regulations protect personal health information, are enforced by a dedicated
office within a federal agency, and specify clear remedial measures for
violations of health privacy.196 While comparisons to foreign health privacy
law must be undertaken with careful consideration of the specific limitations
of the Russian legal system, Russia should, like the United States, further
clarify the statutory right to health privacy, the remedies tied to the violation
of that right, and the path to legal redress for the right’s infringement.197
A.

The HIPAA Clearly Defines and Provides Mechanisms for Redress of
Violations of Health Privacy

Unlike Russian Law related to health privacy, HIPAA and
accompanying regulations clearly define the parameters and appropriate
disclosures of protected health information.198 HIPAA provides guidelines
for the promulgations of standards related to privacy,199 and provides for
clear remedial action.200
192
Kodeks RF ob Administrativnykh Pravonarusheniiakh [KOAP] [Code of Administrative
Violations] art. 23.44(2)(2).
193
See Law on Personal Data, supra note 98, art. 23.
194
Kodeks RF ob Administrativnykh Pravonarusheniiakh [KOAP] [Code of Administrative
Violations] art. 23.13(1).
195
BOYLE & MACK, supra note 87, at 4:1; see generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d-2)-(d-7) (2000).
196
See infra Part VI.A.
197
See infra Part VI.B.
198
See infra Part VI.A.1.
199
See infra Part VI.A.2.
200
See infra Part VI.A.3.
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The HIPAA Defines Permissible Uses of Personal Health Information

The HIPAA provides comprehensive protection of health
information201 and provides for the preemption of less stringent state
privacy laws.202 As such, HIPAA creates a “‘floor’ of privacy protection
rather than a ‘ceiling,’” with a general baseline of uniformity.203 A major
principle of the related regulations “is to define and limit the circumstances
in which an individual’s protected hea[l]th information may be used or
disclosed by covered entities.”204 HIPAA covers entities that handle
personal health information205 and expressly authorizes the regulation of
“individually identifiable health information,” including “oral, written, or
otherwise recorded information that is created or received by an employer,
health care provider, health plan, or health care clearinghouse” relating to
personal health.206 Identifiable information, otherwise known as “protected
health information”207 (“PHI”) includes information relating to an
individual’s physical or mental health condition, to the provision of health
care to the individual, or to the payment for health care that could reasonably
be used to identify the individual.208 Thus, information related to HIV
infection status qualifies as PHI.209
The regulations accompanying HIPAA (“Privacy Standards”) allow
limited disclosures of PHI. A covered entity may disclose PHI: 1) to the
individual; 2) for treatment and payment; 3) where there is an implied
opportunity to agree or object to use; 4) incident to otherwise permitted uses
and disclosures; 5) for the public interest; and 6) for limited research.210 In
the case of disclosures for the public interest, specific limitations apply so as
to balance an individual’s interest in personal privacy and the public need for
information.211 For example, in the case of disclosure of PHI for public
health activities, a covered entity may disclose PHI only to limited named
201
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groups including public health authorities authorized to collect information
for controlling disease.212 To avert a serious threat to public safety, covered
entities may disclose PHI to someone whom they believe can avert the
threat.213 Finally, covered entities must develop and utilize procedures to
limit disclosures.214
Like HIPAA, Russian law related to health privacy contemplates
appropriate uses and disclosures of health information; yet, unlike HIPAA,
Russian law provides broad exceptions for disclosure. Under Russian law,
information constituting a “medical secret” may be disclosed: 1) for
treatment; 2) where there is a threat of the spread of infectious disease; 3) at
the request of a court; 4) when aiding a minor; and 5) where injury to a
person may have resulted from illegal action.215 While such disclosures are
similar to those permitted under HIPAA, unlike HIPAA, Russian law does
not limit to whom such information may be disclosed. Nor does the law
provide guidance as to which personal information may be disclosed.
Instead, the law appears to leave such questions to the discretion of the
health care provider or the party seeking the information. As such, for
example, the exception for disclosure in the case of the threat of the spread
of infectious disease216 could leave individuals with HIV/AIDS vulnerable to
unlimited disclosure of information pertaining to their health status.
2.

While Both Russian Law and HIPAA Delegate Rulemaking Authority
to Administrative Bodies, Russian Law Lacks Clear Guidelines for
Promulgation of Standards

Both HIPAA and Russian law provide for agency oversight of
regulations related to public health. Yet Russian law lacks clear guidelines
with respect to the promulgation of health privacy regulations.
The HIPAA authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (“DHHS”) to submit recommendations to Congress
regarding the appropriate uses of PHI.217 The resulting Privacy Standards
must clarify the rights of individuals with respect to health privacy,
procedures through which individuals are able to exercise those rights, and
which disclosures of such information are allowed or required.218 Originally,
212
213
214
215
216
217
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HIPAA authorized DHHS to issue final regulations governing the use of PHI
if Congress had not enacted privacy legislation within three years of the
enactment of HIPAA.219 Because Congress did not enact such legislation
within three years, DHHS developed a final rule, subject to public notice and
comment.220
Similar to provisions under HIPAA, Russian legislation authorizes the
promulgation of standards that affect health. Yet, while various Russian
executive bodies are authorized to promulgate regulations relating to health
or privacy, none of the bodies are specifically authorized to draft or
promulgate health privacy regulations. For example, the Ministry of Health
and Social Development is responsible for elaborating policy related to
public health in general221 and HIV prevention in particular, 222 and for
submitting drafts of proposed legislation to the government.223 The Ministry
is not expressly authorized to adopt rules related to health privacy.
Likewise, the Law on Personal Data authorizes an executive body to submit
proposed legislation to the government relating to privacy,224 but does not
mandate that such proposals include those related to health privacy.
3.

Unlike Remedies Available Under Russian Law, HIPAA Provides
Clear Remedies for Breaches of Health Privacy

While remedies available for breaches of privacy under Russian law
are unpredictable, HIPAA and the Privacy Standards provide clearly defined
remedial measures. The HIPAA Privacy Standards seek to promote
compliance among covered entities.225 And, HIPAA does not provide for a
private right of action for individuals harmed by failures of compliance.226
Rather, a person who is a victim of conduct proscribed by HIPAA may file a
written complaint with the Secretary of DHHS through the Office for Civil
Rights.227 The Secretary has the discretion to investigate and to impose civil
219
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or criminal penalties.228 Primary enforcement is carried out through the
investigation of complaints.229
HIPAA provides for both civil and criminal penalties.230 The law
provides for civil penalties when “the failure to comply [with the statute]
was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.”231 Each violation may
result in a $100 civil penalty; civil penalties are capped at $25,000 per
person or entity per year for any specific violation.232 The United States
Department of Justice enforces HIPAA’s criminal penalties upon receipt of
complaints from DHHS.233 Criminal penalties result where “a person
knowingly and in violation” of HIPAA, discloses PHI.234 The maximum
penalty is exacted for offenses “committed with the intent to sell, transfer, or
use individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage,”
for which an individual can be sentenced to ten years in prison and fined
$250,000.235
Alternately, while violations of health privacy under Russian law may
involve civil, criminal, or administrative penalties, the path to legal redress
and the parameters of such liability remain unclear. First, while the Law on
Personal Data authorizes an executive body to grant injunctions against the
misuse of information236 and to appeal to a court on behalf of a victim of a
violation,237 the law neglects to name such a body or to designate an agency
in charge of health-related violations. Second, both the Omnibus HIV/AIDS
Legislation and the Law on Health Protection provide for various types of
remedies, yet do not specify what constitutes a breach or which type of
breach would result in a specific penalty.238 Third, remedies for violations of
privacy under the Criminal Code239 and Civil Code240 do not clearly relate to
health information or define the scope of liability for violations of health
privacy. In effect, vague provisions in existing law likely provide
inadequate remedies to deter future breaches of confidentiality.
228
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The HIPAA Provides a Framework for Stronger Health Privacy in
Russia

Because monetary considerations alone would likely hinder the
implementation of a comprehensive system modeled after HIPAA in
Russia,241 wholesale adoption of legislation like HIPAA in Russia is likely
unfeasible. Still, while taking into account the institutional and legal
differences between the United States and Russia, Russian law should, like
HIPAA, clarify the statutory right to health privacy, the remedies tied to the
violation of that right, and the path to legal redress for the right’s
infringement.
1.

Russian Law Should Provide Clear Rights to Health Privacy

Like the regulations accompanying HIPAA, Russian law should
further elucidate permissible and impermissible uses of health information.
Russian legislation provides protection of the fact that a person has
requested treatment, of medical diagnosis, and of data regarding
treatment.242 Yet such explicit protections conflict with the limited
protections for diagnosis in the Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation243 and leave
health care providers and government bodies with great discretion in the
protection of health information. Reconciling protections in existing
legislation in order to clarify and expand the right to health privacy may
grant health care providers less discretion in protecting health information
and may, in turn, encourage individuals to learn their HIV status.244
Clarifying the right to health privacy entails clarifying responsibility
for the promulgation of legislation related to that right. Like HIPAA,
Russian law should require the drafting and proposal of regulations related
to health privacy by a single named body. While HIPAA grants DHHS the
authority to promulgate regulations related to health privacy, Russian law
should require that health privacy standards be proposed by an executive
241
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body but be enacted by Parliament. Generally, Russian federal bodies have
the power to issue normative regulations based on general delegation or by
ad hoc delegation of the legislature.245 The Ministry of Health, for example,
may submit drafts of federal laws to the government, and may independently
adopt normative acts on a variety of specific subjects—none of which
currently relates to health privacy.246
Because of the sometimes loosely defined scope of administrative
authority in Russian law,247 Russian legislation related to health privacy
should leave limited discretion to an executive body. For example,
enactment of the relevant rules for health privacy could be drafted by the
Ministry of Health because of that agency’s experience with health policy,
but enacted only through statute, that is, by Parliament,248 in order to ensure
that infringement on health privacy is minimal.249
2.

Russian Law Should Provide Clear Remedies for Violations of the
Right to Health Privacy

To promote compliance, Russian law, like HIPAA, should encompass
clear remedial measures. Changes to Russian law must, however, take into
account the backdrop of Russia’s civil law system.250 In particular, such
changes to existing remedies would likely have to be applied to various
Russian legal codes. Current laws related to HIV/AIDS and privacy allow
the imposition of administrative, criminal, and civil responsibility,251
therefore implicating the Administrative, Criminal, and Civil Codes. While
these codes allow for various types of remedial measures, they also provide
for similar remedies. For example, the violation of privacy entails possible
imposition of fines under each of the codes.252 As such, current code
provisions related to privacy leave great discretion to the judge or agency
hearing a case in the ordering of remedies. Such ambiguity should be
limited by amending the codes to provide more explicit direction to judges
245
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and agencies as to specific types of remedies applicable to particular
violations of health privacy.
3.

Changes in Law Should Clarify Legal Processes for Redressing
Violations

In addition to clarifying the parameters of health privacy and the
remedies available for its violation, law related to health privacy should
present a clear path for legal redress. Overlapping jurisdiction of the courts
and the lack of a specifically designated administrative body to handle health
privacy complaints renders the path to redress unclear. In light of potential
problems of individual citizens accessing courts, clear agency oversight, as
under HIPAA, could provide an alternative to traditional courts as a means
of securing a remedy.
Current Russian law related to personal privacy already authorizes
both a private right of action253 and initiation of action by agencies.254 A law
specifically related to health privacy should maintain this system. Unlike
under HIPAA, the existence of a private right of action may be essential. In
the context of the overlapping jurisdiction of the Russian legal system,
where privacy rights have long been uncertain,255 a private right may be an
important incentive to encourage seeking redress. Actual individual
recoveries under the law could discourage future violations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Existing Russian law allows broad exceptions for the disclosure of
private health information and fails to provide a clear remedial path for those
whose rights to privacy have been violated. Because of a lack of predictable
remedies for violations of health privacy, Russian law likely does not
promote compliance. In turn, a lack of compliance with existing privacy
protections means that individuals likely to suffer stigma related to drug use
or HIV/AIDS will not seek governmental assistance. To encourage
individuals traditionally subject to discrimination to seek HIV testing, the
Russian Federation should clarify and reconcile existing protections for
health privacy.
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As comprehensive health privacy legislation, HIPAA provides a
framework for change in Russian law. The clear definitions and remedial
actions for violations of health privacy under HIPAA provide a model of
greater protections for individuals living with HIV/AIDS in Russia. In
particular, to promote HIV/AIDS treatment, Russian law should further
clarify the statutory right to health privacy, the remedies tied to the violation
of that right, and the path to legal redress for the right’s infringement.

